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STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an action to impose a trust on certain mining
claims and for an accounting of the proceeds. The trial
court held in favor of the plaintiffs and respondents,
and this appeal is taken from the judgment. The parties hereto are the heirs at law of one A. L. Tomlinson,
· deceased. The plaintiffs and respondents, who will hereafter be referred to as plaintiffs, are the brother and
sisters of the defendant and appellant, who was the administrator of the estate of A. L. Tomlinson, deceased,
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and will hereafter be referred to as defendant. The
n1ining claims involved herein were known as the Camp
Bird Nos. 1-14, and will be referred to herein as the
Camp Bird claims. The question of the trust was tried
before the court September 13, 14 and 15, 1954, and it is
but a small part of the transcript. The matter of the
accounting was tried in January and February of 1958,
and accounts for the major part of the record. This
appeal mainly concerns the issues relating to the trust.
The transcript of the testimony is in two volumes. The
volume relating to the testimony September 13, 14, and
15, 1954 will be referred to as Volume One and designated
as, "(T1)". The volume relating to the testimony January and February, 1958, will be referred to as Volume
Two and designated as, "(T2) ".
The Camp Bird claims were originally located by
the defendant, his father A.L. Tomlinson and the husbands of two of the plaintiffs, (Tl. 43, 94, 2-!8). At the
time of his death, A. L. Tomlinson was the sole owner of
the claims, the other locators having conveyed to him by
quit claim deed. The petition for probate was filed in the
Seventh Judicial Court, Emery Count~~, Utah, in June of
1942, Probate No. 57±, (Exh. 18) (Tl. 150). One Alvin
Wallace was appointed and qualified as adininistrator
of the estate. The 1nining claims were subject to conflicting claims of other locators, and in 1942, the Tomlinson interest in the Camp Bird clailns was reduced to
7.5 percent interest. The stipulation setting forth the
interest is a part of Probate file No. 57 4, Exhibit 18.
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Thereafter, the Tomlinson interest was reduced to 5
percent, ( Tl. 125). The 2.5 percent being conveyed to
F. B. Hammond, attorney for the estate, in settlement
of his claims, (Exh. 18) (T1125). In February of 1949,
the heirs compelled the removal of the administrator
and the defendant, Leslie A. Tomlinson, was appointed.
The inventory and appraisal filed in said probate proceeding listed the Camp Bird claims as the only asset of
the estate, and the claims were appraised at a total value
of $2800.00. Prior to his appointment as administrator,
the defendant had relocated the Camp Bird claims because there was doubt as to their validity, (Tl. 250). Following his appointment, the defendant, as administrator,
entered into several lease agreements for the purpose of
mining the ore from the claims. These leases purported
to lease the entire interest in the Camp Bird claims, ( Tl.
250), the administrator not being aware of the stipulation
giving other parties 95 percent of the Camp Bird claims.
These leases provided for the usual15 percent royalty to
be paid to the Tomlinson estate, and the Atomic Energy
Commission, the only purchaser, was advised of the lease
agreements, and all the royalty checks were paid to the
estate bank account at Grand Junction, Colorado, (Exh.
F) (Tl. 251; T2. 114). As a result of these operations,
$7,329.80 in royalty monies had been paid into the estate
account by April of 1950, (Tl. 251-253).
In January of 1950, the defendant entered into a
lease arrangement with E. G. Frawley, who assigned the
lease to a corporation he organized under the nmne of
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Continental Mining & Milling Company, hereafter referred to as Continental. The lease agreement (Exh.
0) (Tl. 251-258) recited matters relating to conflicting
claims and the stipulation reducing the Tomlinson interest to 5 percent. This was the first the defendant knew
of the stipulation, (Tl. 257). The agreement contained
the recital that the conflicts were without merit and that
it was the intention to lease the entire interest in the
Camp Bird claims. Upon these representations, the
corporation agreed to clear the title. To facilitate the
lease arrangement, the administrator obtained quit claim
deeds from each of the heirs of the estate. These deeds
are referred to as the 1950 deeds. The administrator
wrote to the heirs advising them of the contemplated
lease and requested the quit claim deeds. The defendant advised them that the claims would be held for their
benefit as their interest might appear, (Exh. C). Shortly
after the execution of the lease, the lessee, Continental,
filed an action against the estate on the grounds that the
title to the ·Can1p Bird claims had been 1nisrepresented.
This action was never tried, ( Tl. 288). During the spring
of 1950, a substantial part of the owners of other claims
on Temple l\Iountain entered into a lease with Consolidated Uranium l\iines, Inc., hereafter referred to as Consolidated, (T2. 122). These parties included smne of the
persons ·who had an interest in the Crunp Bird claims
under the stipulation of 1942 and others who claimed
ownership of the ground by reason of conflicting clailns,
(T2. 122). In January of 1951, the defendant individually
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and as administrator of the estate, signed a document purporting to be a joinder to the lease upon certain specific
conditions, (Exh. R) (T2. 34). The conditions were that
the corporation, subject to an action filed in the District
Court of Emery County, Utah, Civil No. 1713, obtain
from all the parties to the lease an acknowledgment of
the Tomlinson 5 percent interest, and an agreement to
pay all accrued royalties according to that interest. In
December, 1951, the defendant individually and as administrator of the estate entered into a further stipulation with Therald Jensen and Frank Hanson, attorneys
of Price, Utah, who represented the owners of 95 percent
of the Temple Mountain property, (T2. 122-125). This
stipulation reduced the interest of the Tomlinson estate
to a 3.53 percent interest, and committed the Tomlinson
interest to the 1\tfay, 1950 lease with Consolidated, notwithstanding the joinder of January, 1951, (Exh. R). The
stipulation and agreement also provided that because
of litigation the funds were to be held in a trust account.
In the early part of 1951, the plaintiffs were dissatisfied with the estate, no distribution having been
made, and they made repeated requests of the defendant
to distribute the monies in the estate, ( Tl. 39). The defendant informed the plaintiffs that he could not distribute the estate until the conflicts were resolved and distribution was ordered by the court. This matter finally
came to a head in June of 1952. Under date of June 2,
1952, the plaintiffs and their mother, Lilie M. Tomlinson,
who was not a party to the action, executed quit claim
deeds in favor of the defendant, (Exh. A-1 to A-7).
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These deeds are referred to as the 1952 deeds. In February of 1953, upon due notice to the plaintiffs, the quit
claim deeds were confirmed by the court and the property distributed to the defendant, (Exh. 18).
The plaintiffs had been dissatisfied with the estate
matters since the commencement of the probate proceedings in June of 1942. This was the reason for the change
of administrators in January of 1949. This dissatisfaction became acute in 1951, the plaintiffs demanding that
the administrator distribute the estate property, (Tl. 268,
269). To clarify the situation, C. Allen Elggren, the attorney for the estate, addressed a letter to the defendant
explaining the controversies and possible liabilities of
the estate by reason of the mining operations conducted
by the defendant, (Exh. E). The letter was sent by the
defendant to his mother in Fruita, Colorado, who in turn
showed it to the plaintiffs, (Tl. 183). ~Irs. Cisney lived
next door to ~Irs. Tomlinson, and the other plaintiffs
lived near by or frequently visiting their 1nother. This
situation continued through 1951, and until the late spring
of 1952 when the heirs beca1ne insistent that the estate
be distributed, (Tl. 268). The stipulation of Dece1nber,
1951, had resolved certain of the conflicts, but the Hunt

v. Bi.tterbaum, rase, Civil No. 1713, was still undecided
and other conflicts ·were undetennined. The defendant
and his 1nother, Lilie

~L

T01nlinson, testified that the

heirs ·were told that the defendant could not distribute
the estate and that the conflicts still hadn't been settled.
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The defendant testified that none of the adverse claimants, including the parties to the stipulation and agreement of 1951, were aware of the amount of ore removed
from the Ca1np Bird claims by the defendant in 1949 and
1950. The mother, Lilie M. Tomlinson, testified that the
plaintiffs insisted that they take their share of the estate
and convey the mining claims to the defendant upon the
condition that if any monies were required to be repaid
as a result of the conflicting claims, the defendant would
assume that liability, (Tl. 192). It was also agreed that
the defendant assume all expense relating to the mining
claims, and would make no claim against the plaintiffs,
(Tl. 269). As a result of these conversations, the attorney for the estate drafted the deeds and they were sent
to ~Irs. Tomlinson at Fruita. The defendant was not
present when the plaintiffs executed the deeds except
the plaintiff Alton Tomlinson, who testified that he signed
the deed at his mother's home and that the defendant
was asleep on the couch, ( Tl. 108). All of the deeds were
returned to C. Allen Elggren except one, and he sent them
for recording. The one not returned to Mr. Elggren was
the deed signed by Mrs. Cisney, which was recorded at
her request, (Exh. A-2). At the time the petition for
distribution was heard, Mrs. Lilie l\1. Tomlinson was
present in court as well as the plaintiff Schockley and
1\fr. Lawrence Fuller, husband of the plaintiff Fuller.
Mrs. Fuller and Mrs. Cisney both live in Fruita, Colorado, and testified that they had frequent conversations
about the estate. All of the plaintiffs testified that after
June of 1952, they did not evidence any further interest
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until April, 1954, (Tl. 180). At this time, they received
a letter from John Lowe, one of the attorneys for plaintiffs, advising them that they had an interest in the
Temple Mountain properties and that he could recover
it for them, (Tl. 64). This inquiry to the plaintiffs was
rnade at the suggestion of Mr. Lawrence ~Iigliaccio,
(T2. 46). Mr. Migliaccio had been responsible for the
reduction of the Tomlinson interest and was a constant
antagonist of Mr. Frawley and Consolidated and other
persons connected with that company, (T2. 45). The
circumstances surrounding the contact with the plaintiffs is not entirely unlike the situation presented to this
court in Nokes v. Conttnental1llining and Milling Company, 6 Utah 2d 177,308 P. 2d 954.
Early in 1950, the defendant assisted :Jir. E. G.
Frawley, president of Consolidated, in an attempt to
commit the various owners of the Ternple ~fountain properties to a lease with Consolidated, (T2. 125, 206-209).
During this time, he assisted in loc.ating other claims and
relocating existing claims on Te1nple l\Iountain. He also
worked as a foreman for Consolidated on Temple )fountain claims owned and located by that company and
Continental. The defendants association '"ith l\fr. Frawley continued until1953. In the fall of 1952, ~Ir. Frawley
gave the defendant 32,000 shares of the cmnnron stock
of Consolidated, (Tl. 306). This stock was given by
reason of the work he had done for Consolidated over
the past two years. In 1953 and 1954, the defendant sold
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the stock. The plaintiffs in their complaint asked that
a trust be imposed on the proceeds of the sale of the
stock.
The testimony of the plaintiffs relating to the circumstances surrounding the execution of the 1952 deeds
adds up to one fact; they were completely ignorant of all
matters relating to the estate and the properties of the
estate. On direct examination, each testified that they
did not know the condition of the estate, when it might
be closed, their interest in the estate as an heir, the status
of the titles of the mining claims, what claims were in the
estate, the litigation with relation to the claims, the value
of the mining claims, the extent that mining had been
conducted on the claims, the amount of royalty paid into
the estate nor the matters relating to the ~tock of Consolidated. This testimony is summarized on pages 26 to
30 of the transcript, Volume One. On cross examination,
the plaintiffs testified that at the time they signed the
1952 deeds they had in mind that they had previously
executed deeds, and the circumstances relating thereto,
(Tl. 47, 108). The plaintiff Cisney testified that she
signed the deed believing it was required to enable the
defendant to enter into a lease and that the defendant
agreed to divide the claims equally, ( Tl. 43, 85). All of
the other plaintiffs stated that they relied on what Mrs.
Cisney had told them in executing the deeds, and specifically stated they did not rely on the defendant, (Tl.
65, 77, 96,132, 135). Each of them stated in identical
words that the defendant had agreed to divide the claims
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equally. On cross examination, the plaintiffs also admitted they were told the estate could not be distributed
until the title and conflicting claims were settled,
(Tl. 96, 256, 265, 266). They also adn1itted that they
knew there was $5,000.00 or $6,000.00 in the estate bank
account, (Tl. 73, 100), and they were entitled to an equal
share in the claims as an heir, (Tl. 44, 77). In executing
the 1952 deeds, they stated that they did not read them
except to note that the Camp Bird claims were listed,
(Tl. 52). During the trial in September, 1954, these
plaintiffs claimed a privilege when asked if they. had
discussed the matters relating to the estate with their
husbands. In subsequent hearings in January and February of 1958, Lawrence Cisney, the husband of nfarguerite Cisney, took the stand as a witness on behalf of the
plaintiffs. On cross examination, he admitted that he and
his wife and the plaintiff Fuller were on the claims in
1950 and had talked to ~fr. Frawley, (Tl. 82) ; that ~fr.
Frawley told them they would soon begin to get something from the mining claims, (T2. 53). He also testified
that they knew the claims had been leased to Consolidated
and that the defendant had been prmnised son1e of Consolidated's stock by ~Ir. Frawley. ( T2. 53). Of the
1natters whieh plaintiffs clain1ed they had no knowledge,
only two are not ad1nitted. These h\'O 1natters are the
status of the titles of the mining clailns and the Yalue of
the 1nining elaims. The defendant called as a ·witness
Therald Jensen, an attorney of Price, Utah. He testified
that the title of the Can1p Bird rlai1ns was

Yer~-

question-

able and he regarded then1 as having only a nuisance
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value, ( T2. 122). The only testimony in the record as to
the value of the claims in 1952 is the amount of royalty
that the mining operations had produced, a fact lrnown
to the plaintiffs. The defendant was asked if he knew
the status of the titles of the mining cla.ims and the value
of the mining claims, over the objection of the defendant
that this called for a conclusion, the defendant testified
that he was advised that the validity of the Camp Bird
claims was questionable, (Tl. 275). He further stated that
he did not have any idea as to the value of the mining
cla.ims, (Tl. 275). As to all matters the plaintiffs admitted or it was shown by evidence that they had equal
knowledge with the defendant. While five of the six
plaintiffs were women, three of them, Beebe, Cisney and
Fuller, were married to men who had an acquaintance
with mining activities, two of whom had been locators
of the Camp Bird cla.ims. One of the plaintiffs was in
business for herself, ( Tl. 133), and all the others had an
education superior to that of the defendant, ( Tl. 248).
The plaintiff Alton Tomlinson was a rancher and admitted familiarity with business dealings and the manner
in which real estate is transferred and the effect of a
quit claim deed, (Tl. 107-110). The defendant was a carpenter by trade, having little or no formal education.
His first contact with mining was after the death of his
father when he attempted to relocate the claims. He had
no experience which qualified him as a business man,
earning his livelihood as a manual laborer, ('Tl. 247, 248).
The plaintiffs referred to him as, "Tight old Les." In
contrast to the testimony of the plaintiffs, their mother,
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Lilie M. Tomlinson, related the conversations she had
with Cisney and the other plaintiffs. She testified that
it was the understanding of everyone that they were
conveying the claims to Les for whatever he might gain
or lose, and they were not to be responsible in any way,
(Tl. 190). In their complaint, the plaintiffs did not join
Mrs. Tomlinson as a party plaintiff, but in the prayer of
the complaint asked that the trust be imposed upon the
Inining claims for her benefit. Mrs. Tomlinson refused to
be a party, and the complaint was amended eliminating
her from the prayer for relief, (R. 9). The evidence in
the accounting introduced by the plaintiffs disclosed the
liability which the estate was subject to on June 2, 1952.
The plaintiffs own accounting claimed $16,000.00 should
have been paid to the estate as royalties to May, 1950,
(Exh. N). At that time, it was undisputed and admitted
by all of the plaintiffs that they knew that the Tomlinson
interest had been reduced to 5 percent. Of the amount
of royalty claimed according to plaintiffs evidence, they
are only entitled to $800.00, the re1naining belonging to
the parties to the 1942 and 1951 stipulations. The $16,000.00 royalty was based on contracts providing for a

payment of 15 percent of the 1nill returns. Therefore, the
plaintiffs evidence show that the estate was liable for
over $100,000.00 by reason of the trespass if the title to
the Cmnp Bird claims was upset. The plaintiffs never
stated that the disclosure of any of the facts claiined to
have been withheld would have cmupelled them to act
differently.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE CONCLUSIONS AND JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL
COURT THAT A TRUST WAS CREATED MUST BE REVERSED AS A MATTER OF LAW.
POINT II.
A TRUST CANNOT BE IMPOSED ON PROPERTY
WHICH IS NOT PART OF THE ESTATE AND WAS NOT IN
EXISTENCE AT THE TIME THE TRUST WAS CREATED.
POINT III.
THE PLAINTIFFS ARE GUILTY OF LACHES AND ARE
NOT ENTITLED TO EQUITABLE RELIEF.
POINT IV.
THE PROBATE DECREE IS RES JUDICATA AND IS
NOT SUBJECT TO COLLATERAL ATTA·CK.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE CONCLUSIONS AND JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL
COURT THAT A TRUST WAS ·CREATED MUST BE REVERSED AS A MATTER OF LAW.

The consideration of the correctness of the trial
court's conclusion with respect to the trust has several
facets. First, the nature of the trust, secondly, the fiduciary relationship of the parties, and thirdly, the character of the evidence required to sustain the conclusion
of the trial court.
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The nature of the trust imposed in the instant case,
is found in conclusions 1, 2, and 3 of the Conclusions of
Law, (R. 91, 92). In conclusions 1 and 2, the court concluded that the defendant held the property upon an express trust for the benefit of the plaintiffs. In conclusion
3, the court concluded that the defendant held the property upon a constructive trust for the benefit of the
plaintiffs. It is difficult to understand how an express
and constructive trust can exist at the same time, as to
the same property and for the benefit of the same persons. The distinctions between the trusts are clear and
the creation of one must necessarily negative the creation
of the other. The distinctions are spelled out in IV Scott
on Trusts, sec. 462.1, pp. 3104, 3105 :
"Sec. 462.1. Constructive trusts distinguished from express and resulting trusts. An express
trust is a fiduciary relationship "ith respect to
property, arising as a result of a manifestation
of an intention to create it and subjecting the person in whmn the title is vested to equitable duties
to deal with it for the benefit of others. On the
other hand, a constructive trust arises ·where a
person holding title to property is subject to an
equitable duty to eonve~- it to another on the
ground that he ·would be unjustly enriched if he
were permitted to retain it. In both cases the
person who has the title to the property is under
an eqilltable dut~T to deal ·with it for the benefit
of another person. To this extent the two types
of trust are siinilar. In other respects, however,
they differ. An express trust arises because the
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parties intended to create it. A constructive
trust is not based upon the intention of the parties but is imposed in order to prevent one of them
from being unjustly enriched at the expense of the
other. In the case of an express trust the trustee
ordinarily has active duties of management. In
the case of a constructive trust, the duty is merely
to surrender the property. A constructive trust,
unlike an express trust, is not a fiduciary relation.
The circumstances which give rise to a constructive trust may, but do not necessarily, involve a
fiduciary relation.

* * *
"From what has been said it will be seen that
it is useless if not mischievious to attempt to
phrase a definition of a trust so as to include both
express trusts and constructive trusts. They are
distinct concepts. They are not two species of a
single genus."
From the foregoing statement, it would appear that
one might plead an express trust and as an alternative
a constructive trust, but to say that both coexist as a
conclusion of law upon which a judgment is based would
appear to be such a contradiction that as a matter of
law the judgment must be reversed. The importance of
this objection to the determination of the trial court is
more serious than a claim of error upon technical distinctions, but is an integral part of the other facets above
specified. The trusts imposed herein are based upon
a fiduciary relationship. The nature of the relationship
is important because it influenced the conclusion that an
express and constructive trust were created. And more
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important the decision of the trial court was based entirely on the single fact of a fiduciary relationship. No
express trust was proven and the conduct of the defendant was not sufficient to raise a constructive trust even
in the presence of a fiduciary relationship. The defendant does not believe that a fiduciary is a highway that
persons blind and ignorant to their rights, negligent in
protecting them, tardy in objecting to them, can travel
to recover what they have neglected and cast away. The
fiduciary relationship is of obvious importance because
in the words of Professor Scott, the truth of the matter
is that whenever a court wishes to compel a transferee
to reconvey the property, it can do so by laying stress
ori the confidential relation, and it is as much a matter
of truth that if the court desires to deny relief it can
lay stress upon the policy of the Statute of Frauds and
emphasize the possibilities of fraudulent claims which
might be made if relief was given. I Scott on Trusts, sec.
-±4.2, p. 322. In substance, the fiduciary relationship is a
two-way street, and not restricted to travel by only the
plaintiffs. The fiduciary relationship might be said to be
twofold. First, the duty by reason of being administrator
of the estate, and secondly, by reason of the family relationship between the parties. That duty as it relates to
the office of administrator is defined as follows:
2 Bancroft Probate Practice, sec. 332, p. 277:
.. An adn1inistrator is said to be 1nore the
representative of the creditors than of the heirs.
He holds the estate as a trust fund for the payInent of debts. He does, however. to a large extent
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also represent the heirs or devisees, as is indicated by the fact that they are often dependent
upon his diligence for the maintenance of their
rights."
Sec. 334, p. 279 :
"In general, his duties are to preserve the
estate until distribution, to collect and safely keep
the property, to pay the indebtedness of the deceased and the charges of administration and to
put the estate in such condition that distribution
may be had, and, when claims are satisfied, to
pass the estate pursuant to order of court on to
those entitled."

I I S coU on Trusts, sec. 173, p. 1293 :
"Sec. 173. Duty to furnish information. The
trustee is under a duty to the beneficiaries to
give them upon their request at reasonable times
complete and accurate information as to the administration of the trust. The beneficiaries are
entitled to know what the trust property is and
how the trustee has dealt with it. They are entitled to examine the trust property and the accounts and vouchers and other documents relating
to the trust and its administration. Where a trust
is created for several beneficiaries, each of them
is entitled to information as to the trust."
The duty of brother to sister has always been regarded as requiring fair dealing, however, not to the extent
of giving advise and counsel. This may or may not be
the situation as a practical matter. It must be accepted
as a common occurrence that the relationship is at times
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characterized by suspicion and distrust, by an attitude
of wariness and more frequently of envy and jealousy.
Where these occur, the fiduciary relationship is insecure
and the words, "We trust him," are most abused.
The plaintiffs in this action are adults, none of whom
are under a physical or mental disability, and who had
education and experience superior or equal to the defendant. Their attitude towards the defendant bordered on
contempt referring to him as, "Tight old Les," because
of his ability to accumulate a little money and property
from the wages of an ordinary laborer. In addition to
this, the appointment of the defendant as administrator
was not indicative of any trust. The defendant was the
only heir living in the State of Utah and had a statutory
preference. In the final analysis, the plaintiffs demonstrated the nature of their trust by accepting the solicitation in 1954, brought about by Lawrence Migliaccio, who,
with his attorneys John W. Lowe and Thomas C. Cuthbert, were primarily responsible for the reduction of the
Tomlinson interest to a 3.53 percent. (Hunt v. Bitter-

baum, Civil No. 1713 in the District Court of En1ery
County, State of Utah.) The trust they claim to have had
in the defendant did not extend to the courtesy of a
personal inquiry before accepting the assistance offered
by the attorneys. If this fiduciary relationship is to be
emphasized to the extrmne necessary to sustain tlris judgInent, the truth is 1nore callus than Professor Scott
in1plied.
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By reason of the fortuitous or unfortuitous event of
being an heir, a person is not relieved of the necessity
of 1naking decisions with respect to the rights that event
ereated. This court has announced this principle.

In re Blodgett's Estate, 70 P. 2d 742, 93 Utah 1:
"His duty as administrator went to the obligation to take into possession and disclose all estate property and all information to those interested in the estate as to estate matters, thus putting them on the same plane as he was as to such
information regarding all the assets and transactions, but, when that is done, he has performed his
duty to a party in regard to whom he is in controversy as to their respective interests. In that relationship, after they are on an even plane as to
all estate matters, she must exercise the decisions
as to whether she will stand firm or recede in the
controversy between them as to differenees of
opinion regarding their rights."
The plaintiffs rely on a total absence of knowledge
of the facts. They testified that they never took any
interest in the estate. In executing the deeds, they did not
rely on representation of the defendant, but did rely on
the statement of one of the plaintiffs who, inspite of the
elaim of total ignorance, advised the other heirs to execute the deeds. Taking into consideration the fact that
their entire testimony was negative except a single statement deemed necessary to create an allusion of express
trust, i.e., the defendant had agreed to divide the claims
equally; that the only testimony offered in support of
their cause was their own testimony necessarily colored
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because of their direct pecuniary interest. It must be
concluded that as a matter of law, no trust was proven.
This court has considered the proposition as follows:
Coray v. Holbrook, et al., 121 P. 572, 575, 40 Utah

325:

"* * * One seeking to have rights declared awl
enforced, founded upon a verbal or written agreement, and involving or growing out of an alleged
trust or confidential relation, is required, among
other things, to show, with at least reasonable
certainty, the terms of the agreement and the
character and extent of the trust or confidential
relation. These things cannot be left to loose or
flexible language, or to vague or indefinite terms.
The court, from the language used, from the acts
and conduct of the parties, and from all the facts
and circumstances surrounding the alleged agreement, and under which it was made, must be able
to ascertain, with at least reasonable certainty,
the essential terms of the agreement and the character and extent of the alleged trust or confidential relation."
The character of the plaintiffs evidence requires consideration of the proof necessary to establish a trust.
The accepted rule as to the burden or proof in fraud cases
is that the person seeking to ilnpose a constructive or an
express trust has the burden of establishing the facts that
giv<> ri~(' to such a trust. He n1ust establish such facts
hy clear and convincing evidence, it is not enough to establish theu1 h~· a 1nere preponderance of the eYidence.
Flemin.f! v. F!CJwiug-F('lt ComJJall,lJ~ 7 lTtah :?d 293 323 P.
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2d 712. r:rhe court in its oral decision at the beginning of
the January hearings, states, "but the proof in the other
case satisfied me, or by a fair preponderance of the evidence," (T2.6). The case should be reversed upon this
alone, but defendant's case is based on a more fundamental principle than what might be characterized as an
academic distinction between a mere preponderance and
clear and convincing evidence. The defendant contends
that in absence of any affirmative proof whatsoever,
as a matter of law a constructive trust cannot be created
or in1posed and an express trust is not established, IV
Scott on Trusts, sec. 462.6, p. 3112.
Not every transaction between administrator and an
heir can be made the subject matter of a constructive
trust. And where the transaction is entirely between
heirs, none of whom are acting under an incapacity, the
circumstances of the fraud should be clear and convincing. Beginning with line 26, page 139 to line 16 on page
141 of Volume One of the transcript, counsel for the plaintiffs summarized the entire testimony of all of the plaintiffs. This summary was the direct examination of V ada
J. Tomlinson Acott, and in the direct examination of
every other plaintiff, including Mrs. Cisney, the same
answers are found. In the testimony on the pages indicated, the plaintiffs simply answer, "No" to matters
which would be common knowledge to a person claiming
an interest in property. Each of the plaintiffs testified
that they relied entirely on the plaintiff Cisney when
they signed the deeds in 1952. It is difficult to understand why a person knowing absolutely nothing would
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advise her brother and sisters, who also knew absolutely
nothing, to sign quit claim deeds. Of the questions asked
on the pages above referred to, the record disclosed that
they were advised of all but two matters in June of 1952;
the value of the interest and the title situation. These
two matters were also beyond the knowledge of the defendant. The title being still in litigation and the only
gauge of value being the royalty. Thus, as a matter of
fact, the plaintiffs knew all there was to know about the
estate. Under such circumstances a constructive trust
cannot arise.

IV Scott on Trusts, sec. 496, p. 3217:
"Sec. 496. Effect of consent of beneficiarY.
As has been stated, ·where a trustee purchas~s
trust property for himself individually ''ith the
consent of the beneficiary, or purchases for himself the interest of the beneficiary. the transaction
cannot be set aside bY the beneficiarY if he was
not under an incapacity, and the tru~tee made a
full disclosure to hiln, and did not induce the sale
by taking advantage of his position or b3- other
ilnproper conduct, and if the transaction was in
all respect fair and reasonable. A silnilar principle is applicable where other kinds of fiduciaries
deal with their beneficiaries. It is probably true
that in som(' fiduciary relations the consent of the
benefician· will prevent his setting aside the
trammetion, although under the sa1ne circumshmees the heneficiar~- of an express trust would
not be precluded frmn setting aside the transaction."
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The nature of the fiduciary and the character of
evidence is important in considering the plaintiffs claim
that there was no consideration. This is believed immaterial because a gratuitous conveyance may be proper,
but the consideration was more than adequate. The plaintiffs claimed that all proceeds shown by Exhibit M had
been received by the defendant. The defendant agreed
to protect the plaintiffs from any judgment or demand,
as well as any repayment of funds ordered by the court,
and to bear all expenses of the estate.
Considering the three matters above set forth, the
plaintiffs are faced with a dilemma. It is impossible
to see how the transaction can be both an express and
constructive trust. They rely on the deeds of 1952 as an
express trust and it must fail because the trust is not
evidenced by an agreement or a memorandum of an oral
agreement as required by the Statute of Frauds, I Scott
on Trusts, sec. 40.1. (Conclusions of Law, paragraph 2,
R. 91). They rely on the deeds of 1950 as the creation of
a constructive trust, (Conclusions of Law, paragraph 3,
R. 91), which fails because the only purpose or effect
that could be given the 1952 deeds is that they extinguish
the 1950 trust whether constructive or express. IV Scott
on Trusts, sec. 481.3, p. 3153.
POINT II.
A TRUST CANNOT BE IMPOSED ON PROPERTY
WHICH IS NOT PART OF THE ESTATE AND WAS NOT IN
EXISTENCE AT THE TIME THE TRUST WAS CREATED.
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In September of 1952, the defendant was given stock
of Con!iolidated by Mr. Fra\vley. The court imposed a
trust on the proceeds of the sale of the stock as an asset
of the estate. The stock was sold in July of 1953, April,
1954 and July, 1954. There is no evidence in the record
tracing any property or assets of the estate into the
stock, (Exh. U). It is difficult to understand on what
theory the plaintiffs claim this an asset of the estate.
There was never any contention that this stock was part
of the original estate of A. L. Tomlinson, deceased. The
inventory and appraisement in the probate proceedings
listed only the Can1p Bird claims. The only document
relating to any stock is the lease with Continental in 1950,
which that company as lessee repudiated. The only property right the Tomlinsons ever had by reason of the estate
was committed to the lease with Consolidated in 1950 by
the agreement, Exhibit F. No part of the estate is missing, no part of the estate was sold by the defendant and
it has never been claimed that the defendant purchased
the stock ·with assets of the estate.

IF Scott on TntSts, sec. 521.-1. p. 3335:
"Sec. 521.-1. Where no property of the claimant was received by the wrongdoer. By the weight
of authority the claimant is not entitled to a preference where, although the wrongdoer received
property of the clai1nant, he subsequently dissipated it. It would seen1 to be even n1ore clear that
the elain1ant i~ not entitled to a preference ·where
no propert~· of the clai1nant was eYer reeeived by
the wrongdoer. In ~ueh a case, there is no propert~· of the wrongdoer which i~ in any sense the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

25
product of the claimant's property, no property
upon which the claimant can enforce an equitable
lien or constructive trust. It has been so held in a
case decided by the Supreme Court of the United
States." Citing McKee v. Paradise, 299 U.S. 119,
122, 57 S. Ct. 124, 81 L. ed. 75, 3 U. Chicago L. Rev.
515.
If nothing of the estate is missing, and it was committed
to a lease upon a royalty basis identical to all other mining claimants, which lease the plaintiffs have confirmed,
it is difficult to see how a trust could be imposed or one
could trace any assets of the estate into stock. In addition
to this, all authorities are of the same mind that a trust
cannot be imposed on nonexisting property. In order to
create a trust on the stock, it would have had to have
been received by the estate at the time the trust was created.

I Scott on Trusts, sec. 86, p. 648:
"Sec. 86. After-acquired property. It is obvious that a person cannot create a trust of property in which he has no interest. The mere fact
that he hopes and. expects to acquire the property
in the future does not give him any· interest of
which he can be trustee, or of which he can make
another trustee, before he acquires it. Where hf~
purports to create a present trust of property
which he does not own but which he expects thereafter to acquire, no trust is presently created. This
is true whether he purports to make a transfer in
trust or to declare himself trustee."
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Sec. 86.4, p. 663 :
"An interest which has not come into existence cannot be held in trust. Thus if a person declares himself trustee of shares of stock in a corporation to be formed, no trust is created at the
time of the declaration, and even if the corporation
is later formed and he received shares of stock
in it, he does not automatically become trustee of
the shares. At most he has made a promise to become trustee in the future, and the promise is not
enforceable if gratuitous."
The trust in this case was created in 1950 or 1952, which,
is uncertain. If an express trust ·was relied on, it was
created in 1952. If it was a constructive trust, the plaintiffs say it was created in 1950. In either event, it was
long before the receipt of the stock. Ir Scott on Trnsts,
sec. 462.4 ~ 4 Bancroft Probate Practice, sec. 1176.
POINT III.
THE PLAINTIFFS ARE GUILTY OF LACHES AND ARE
NOT ENTITLED TO EQUITABLE RELIEF.

The plaintiffs are before the court on one of two
propositions. Either they tran8ferred their interest in
1952 with full kno-wledge of all the facts. or they are
guilty of lache~ such a~ to shock the eonscience of a court
of equity.
It is wPll estabished that people who clailn rights
cannot ad so JwgligPntl~· in relation thereto that it would
lead the ordinary prrson to believe that they had abandon
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their right or never clai1ned a right. This is particularly
so where the defendant substantially changes his position
because of their conduct. IV Scott on Trusts, sec. 466.1,
pp. 3121, 3122. In 1949, the plaintiffs participated in the
re1noval of the administrator originally appointed. This
action would compel an ordinary person to be more vigilant. In spite of this warning, the plaintiffs again closed
their eyes to all the matters until1952 when the image of
dollars captured their entire interest. Having received
the only thing they were interested in, they again slumbered as to matters relating to the estate. They were
awakened a third time in 1954 when the letter from John
Lowe again presented the golden image. A court of
equity might be tolerant and understanding of a person
once sleeping on his rights, if not for too long, however,
where a person sleeps on three separate occasions it
would appear that tolerance and understanding should
be replaced by critical observation and require convincing
justification for repeated offenses. It may also be stated
that a court of equity might be tolerant and understanding where a person once conveys his property away
and attempts to recover it on the state1nent that they did
so under the belief that it would be held for them in trust.
If a person conveys away his property, or permits its
alienation on three occasions, it would appear that tolerance and understanding should again be replaced by critical observation. In 1950, the plaintiffs executed quit
claim deeds absolute in form upon the understanding that
the conveyance was in trust. In 1952, the plaintiffs again
conveyed the same property by deed absolute in form
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and claimed it was held in trust. In 1953, after having
notice of the fact that the petition for distribution would
be heard on a day certain, they permitted a third alienation of their property and now claim it to be subject to
a trust. In the 1950 instance, they received an explanation spelling out the trust, (Exh. ·C), and in 1952, they
testified they were told nothing. The only excuse offered
was blind trust. In 1953, two of the plaintiffs sat in the
courtroom and heard the court distribute the claims to
the defendant as his sole and separate property. They
were again silent. In 1949 when the first awakening occurred, the potential value of uranium mining claims was
not realized. In 1950, the plaintiffs Cisney and Fuller
were physically present on the mining claims and were
told by Mr. Frawley that they would begin to get something out of the property, a time at which the potential
value of uraniu1n 'vas becoming notieeable. In 1952,
uranium entered upon the most spectacular inflation
since John Sutter brought to life an en1pire for a small
sack of eoins, some "·heat, beans and tallow. In February,
1953, uranium 1nining clalins were being bought and sold
for 1nillions. Still the plaintiffs slumbered while a deeree of distribution was entered. The plaintiffs story of
their a wakening by the letter frmn John Lowe in 1954 was
an incident exceeded only by the R\vakening of Sleeping
Beauty hy the gallant prince.
The defense of laehes is clearly stated by Seott on
Trush;:
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II Scott on Trusts, sec. 219, p. 1609:
"Sec. 219. Laches of the beneficiary. A beneficiary 1nay be barred by his laches from holding
the trustee liable for a breach of trust. He is so
barred if he fails to sue the trustee for the breach
of trust for so long a time and under such circun1stances that it would be inequitable to permit him
to hold the trustee liable. A1nong the circumstances which are of importance are the length
of time during which the beneficiary has delayed
in bringing a proceeding against the trustee; the
reasons for such delay; the character of the breach
of trust; the change of circumstances, if any, between the commission of the breach of trust and
the bringing of the proceeding, such as the death
of witnesses or parties, or a change of position by
the trustee. Underlying the notion of the barring
of suit because of laches is the general idea that
it is in accordance with public policy that suits
should be brought with reasonable promptness.
There is also the idea that after the lapse of a
long period of tune it is difficult to ascertain the
truth. There is also the idea of hardship to the
defendant in pressing stale claims against him, although the hardship to him may be outweighed
by the hardship to the plaintiff in denying him
redress.''
In imposing the trust the conduct of the plaintiffs
must be considered. The court should take into consideration that the defendant changed his position. Following
1952, he justifiably treated the property as his own, which
1nade identification of funds subsequently received difficult to trace. His earnings as a laborer were tinged with
the threat of being construed as trust funds. He justifi-
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ably spent money and every expenditure was questioned.
Consideration should be given to the fact that the properties involved sky-rocketed beyond imagination. It should
be considered that the plaintiffs were so careless and
negligent that the ordinary person would be led to believe
that they claimed no interest. It should also be considered,
that having grossly neglected their rights they now want
to be forgiven entirely upon negative testimony. These
circumstances should prevent recovery.

II Scott on Trusts, sec. 170.2, p. 1200:
"Defenses of the trustee. The beneficiaries
may be barred from setting aside a sale by the
trustee to himself where, with knowledge of the
facts, they have acquiesced in the sale. On the
other hand, they are not bound by such acquiescence where they had no knowledge of the facts.
The beneficiaries, having the choice of affirnring
the sale to the trustee or setting it aside, n1ust act
with reasonable pr01nptness after they learn of
the facts. If the~~ delay in 1naking objection to
the sale for an unreasonably long tiine, they "ill
be barred by laches. There is no fixed rule as to
the extent of the delay ·which will preclude the
beneficiaries frmn setting aside the sale. This depends on1nany circun1stances, such as whether the
trustee acted in good faith, whether he has 1nade
expenditures on the property with the knowledge
of the beneficiaries, whether the property was of
fluctuating Yalue, or whether there are other circumstanees 1naking it onl~- fair that the beneficiaries should act prmnptly .. ,
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POINT IV.
THE PROBATE DECREE IS RES JUDICATA AND IS
NOT SUBJECT TO COLLATERAL ATTA.CK.

The fraud which the plaintiffs allege relates entirely
to the execution of the quit claim deeds in 1952. There is
no allegation that a fraud was practiced upon the plaintiffs in obtaining the decree of distribution entered in
1953 in Probate No. 57 4. All of the acts of which the
plaintiffs complain could have been raised by appropriate objection to the petition for distribution. At that
time, the slightest objection by one of the plaintiffs would
have caused the court to withhold its decree until all
of the plaintiffs had an opportunity to be heard. No
objection being made and the petition clearly stating that
the heirs had conveyed their interest to the defendant,
the court ordered the distribution. This court held in
Thomas v. Braffet II eirs, decided December 27, 1956, that
a decree distributing the property of the estate pursuant
to fmnily settlements and stipulations could not be collaterally attacked by the heirs. Thomas v. Braffet Heirs,
6 Ftah 2d 57, 305 P. 2d 507, In the matter of the Estate
of James John Latsis (sometimes known as "Latses"),
deceased, on petition for rehearing, this court reversing
its decision on appeal and affirming the judgment of the
trial court stated:
"There must come an end to probate, and action of the court which is intended to close the
proceedings and settle finally the rights of all
parties does so, even though some individuals may
be prejudiced by that action. Since the order here
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in quest~on fails to put the inquirer upon notice
that there are conditions precedent to its becoming
final, it demands the respect to which a final decree is entitled under the statute." In the Matter
of the Estate of James John Latsis, Deceased, 284
P. 2d 479,3 Utah 2d 365.
The nature of the fraudulent acts which this court
requires to obtain a decree collaterally attacking a
former judgment has been the subject matter of many
decisions. In Anderson v. State, et al., 238 P. 557, 65
Utah 512, this court set forth the nature of the fraud required in attacking a judgment and added that the parties seeking relief must have been free from negligence
in the trial of the case in which the judgment was rendered. Weyant v. Utah Savings and Trust Company,
182 P.189, 54 Utah 181; Wright v. W. E. Callahan Construction Contpany, 156 P. 2d 710, 108 utah 28. In the
Wright case, it was held as follo1\rs:
"It is well settled that a court will not grant
relief and set aside a judgn1ent unless such judgment was obtained by extrinsic fraud; that is
where the fraud practiced in obtaining the judgment prevented the parties frmn having their day
in court and the issues involved frmn being tried.
The failure of a part~- to have used due diligence
in presenting all the facts in the case to the court
or in failing to 1neet any perjured testi1nony is
not such fraud on the court as ''ill be redressed
in a suit directly attacking the judgn1ent. ""\Yhere
the issues involved in a case have been fullv tried,
even though the judg1uent ·was procured by perjured evidenc~ and but for such perjury the result
n1ight have been other\\-ise, the judg1nent will not
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be set aside. To do otherwise would make for
endless litigation. See Cantwell v. Thatcher Bros.
Banking Co., 47 Utah 150, 151 P. 986; Mosby v.
Gisborn, 17 Utah 257, 54 P. 121; Anderson v.
State, 65 Utah 512, 238 P. 557; Pico v. Cohn, 91
Cal. 129, 25 P. 970, 27 P. 537, 13 L.R.A. 336, 25
Am. St. Rep. 159; United States v. Throckmorton,
98 U.S. 61, 25 L. Ed. 93; LaSalle v. Peterson et
al., 220 Cal. 739, 32 P. 2d 612."
In addition to the cited cases, the Utah stautes are
clearly in accord. with the principle of the integrity of
judgment. Section 75-11-37, Utah Code Annotated 1953;
Section 75-1-8, Utah Code Annotated 1953. The defendant did not conceal any facts to obtain the decree. The defendant was and still is of the conviction that the heirs
conveyed title free and clear of their interest. At the
tune of the entry of the decree in 1953, he had no notice
or any suspicions that the plaintiffs would claim that
the property was subject to a trust. The only persons
who had any knowledge of this fact and who failed to
bring it to the attention of the court were the plaintiffs.
In addition to the failure of the plaintiffs to object
at the time of the distribution of the estate, they did
nothing within the time for appeal or the statutory period
permitting a direct attack upon a decree of a probate
court. They cannot dispute the fact that in June of 1952,
they were aware that proceeds were being received from
the operation of the mining claims. This is for the obvious reason that they received a distribution of these
accumulated funds. From J lme, 1952, to February, 1953,
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they made no inquiry or any further demand relating to
royalties paid to the defendant. After having notice of
the petition for distribution, and two of the plaintiffs being present in court at the time the petition was heard,
they still did not within six months after the entry of the
decree make inquiry or demand what they now claim.
Fourteen months later, it still had not occurred
to the plaintiffs to seek their equal share as a result of
the express trust they now claim. It was not until Migliaccio, apparently without their knowledge, procurred an
attorney for their use that they became aware of what
they now say they claimed at all times. If there was ever
a case in which a person was negligent in the assertion
of his rights in a judicial proceedings, this must be the
classic example. It is a reasonable conjecture that absent
the charitable interest of ~1:igliaccio and his attorneys,
the plaintiffs would now be sleeping on rights they cherished. It is said that a judgment can be attacked collaterally if one acts within a reasonable time, meaning that
equity aids the vigilant. Under the circumstances of
this case and the increase of property values, the plaintiffs should have been aware of their rights by 1952, certainly by 1953, but to have to be awakened in April of
195± is a circun1stance suggestive of the Yery reason
why a court of equity refuses to listen to stale demands.
If the decree of the probate court in this case can be collaterally attacked under such circmnstances. the finalit:T
of judg1nents considered so important In the lJfa.tter of
the Estate of James John Latsis, supra, and Thomas v.

Bra.ffet Heirs, supra, will be a discredited principle.
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CONCLUSION
When the plaintiffs executed the 1952 deeds, they
had only one purpose; to get the available money while
they had the chance and under circumstances where they
would not have to repay. They were people of average
intelligence and understanding of property rights. To
say that they signed the deeds to obtain the estate money
or to permit the commitment of the claims to a lease
which had been entered into two years prior thereto and
ratified and confirmed on two occasions, is difficult to
believe. There was no failure to disclose any matter let
alone one which would have caused them to refuse to sign
the 1952 deeds. The royalty rate was the same before and
after, and the properties were no more valuable in 1954
than they were at any other time. Their value had been
settled in 1950 when they were committed to the lease.
\Vhere 1noney is involved, the carefree members of a
family find it easy when they have neglected their inheritance to charge the dilgent member of the family with
cheating. If a party can claim a trust under the circumstances in this case, the purpose of equity and the policy
of the law is ill served.
Respectfully submitted,

FRED H. EVANS
Attorney for Defendant
and Appellant
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